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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
Virginia Joanie Goodman, a person 
under eighteen years of age. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E 
O F T H E CASE 
The appellant, Virginia Joanie Goodman, appeals 
from a decision against her in the Fifth Judicial District 
Juvenile Court, convicting her of interfering with an 
officer and the illegal use of an alcoholic beverage. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The appellant was convicted of interfering with an 
officer and the illegal use of an alcoholic beverage be-
fore the Honorable Paul C. Keller, in the Fifth Judi-
cial District Juvenile Court, on April 25, 1974. Appel-
lant was ordered to attend the alcohol education course 
of the Utah Division of Family Services at Blanding, 
Utah. 
Case No. 
13822 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent respectfully submits the decisions 
and rulings of the Court below should be sustained. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On November 29, 1973, Officer Kenneth Vee Pal-
mer, a San Juan County, Utah, deputy sheriff, was 
driving his patrol car north from Bluff, Utah, when 
he observed a vehicle driven by a person whom he knew 
did not have a driver's license (T. 4-5). Officer Palmer 
stopped the vehicle, and requested that the driver, Linda 
Lehi, get into his patrol car so that he could issue her 
a citation for driving without a valid driver's license 
(T. 5). When the officer and Ms. Lehi were in the car, 
Officer Palmer began issuing a citation (T. 5). 
Officer Palmer testified that the appellant, who 
had been in Ms. Lehi's vehicle along with several others, 
came up to the officer's window, and requested that he 
drive her back to Bluff (T. 5). The officer further testi-
fied that he told the appellant that he was busy and 
couldn't give her a ride to Bluff, but on her continual 
requests he told her he would consider it after he had 
finished the citation (T. 5). Appellant responded with 
threatening remarks, telling the officer that he couldn't 
take possesison of the car and couldn't have it towed to 
Bluff (T. 6). Officer Palmer then advised the appel-
lant that she was interfering wtih his work and made it 
clear to her that he would have to arrest her if she didn't 
leave (T. 6). The officer requested that appellant leave 
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the area and start walking toward Bluff (T. 6). Appel-
lant walked across the highway to a little draw where 
she stopped (T. 6-7). 
After appellant left, Officer Palmer testified that 
he then placed Ms. Lehi under arrest for driving under 
the influence of intoxicating alcohol (T. 15-16). Ap-
pellant then returned to the patrol car and again asked 
the officer to take her to Bluff (T. 16). Officer Palmer 
once again ordered appellant to leave immediately or 
he was going to arrest her for interfering (T. 7). In re-
sponse, appellant said to the officer, "You fuckin' 
puke." (T. 8). Officer Palmer then placed the appel-
lant under arrest for interfering with an officer and the 
unlawful consumption of an alcoholic beverage by a 
minor (T. 8, 18). 
Officer Palmer testified that appellant's actions 
were definitely that of intoxication in that she was very 
loud and talkative, she had an unsteady walk, and the 
smell of alcohol was on her breath (T. 8, 9, 11). Officer 
Palmer also testified that he didn't arrest the appellant 
immediately for intoxication because he felt the issuing 
of the citation to Ms. Lehi was more important and he 
requested appellant to leave the area to prevent having 
to arrest her and thereby giving her a break (T. 11). 
However, Officer Palmer felt compelled to arrest the 
appellant after she uttered her profane remark because 
she was interfering with his work as an officer and caus-
ing him an unusual amount of time to arrest Ms. Lehi 
(T. 9, 10). Officer Palmer also testified that the appel-
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lant was agitating Ernest Casey, who was also arrested, 
and he felt a threat of violence from the other people 
that had been in Ms. Lehi's car (T. 13, 20). 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPEL-
LANT WAS CONVICTED OF INTERFER-
ING WITH AN ARREST OR DETENTION 
IS NOT OVERBROAD AND DOES NOT IN-
FRINGE UPON APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF 
FREE SPEECH. 
Appellant was convicted of interfering with an ar-
rest or detention under Section 76-8-305, Utah Code 
Ann. (Supp. 1973), which provides: 
"A person is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor when he intentionally interferes with a 
person recognized to be a law enforcement of-
ficial seeking to effect an arrest or detention 
of himself or another regardless of whether 
there is a legal basis for the arrest." 
Appellant was arrested under the above section of 
the criminal code because her actions and words were 
interefering with the lawful work of a police officer by 
causing him an unusual amount of time to effect an 
arrest (T. 9, 10). Appellant contends that this section 
is overbroad in that it curtails the First Amendment 
right of freedom of speech. Appellant's brief at 7. 
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The United States Supreme Court has traditional-
ly held that it "is not an abridgment of freedom of 
speech to make a course of conduct illegal merely be-
cause the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language either spoken, writ-
ten or printed." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 
453, 13 L.Ed. 2d 471 (1965). The Supreme Court also 
held in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 378, 88 S.Ct. 
1663, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968), that when speech and 
nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest 
in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inci-
dental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. 
The type of governmental interest necessary to 
curtail the freedom of speech of those persons involved in 
a contact with the police was laid down by the Supreme 
Court in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 
1953, 32 L.Ed. 2d 584 (1972). In Colten, a police of-
ficer stopped a vehicle for an expired license plate. The 
defendant, who was riding in another car and a friend 
of the driver of the stopped vehicle, approached the 
police officer and made an effort to enter the conver-
sation. The defendant and several others were told the 
affair was none of their business and were asked re-
peatedly to leave the area. In response to one of these 
requests, the defendant replied that he wished to make 
a transportation arrangement for the driver of the 
stopped vehicle. The police asked the defendant three 
more times to leave the area and when he refused to do 
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so he was arrested for violating Kentucky's disorderly 
conduct statute. 
In rejecting the defendant's contention that he was 
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, 
the Court stated: 
"[CJolten's conduct in refusing to move 
on atfer being directed to do so was not, with-
out more, protected by the First Amendment. 
Nor can we believe that Colten, although he 
was not trespassing or disobeying any traffic 
regulation himself, could not be required to 
move on. He had no constitutional right to ob-
serve the issuance of a traffic ticket or to en-
gage the issuing officer in conversation at that 
itme." 407 U.S. at 109 
Then the Court established the governmental in-
terest involved: 
''The State has a legitimate interest in en-
forcing its traffic laws and its officers were en-
titled to enforce them free from possible 
interference or interruption from bystanders, 
even those claiming a third-party interest in 
the transaction." 407 U.S. at 109. 
In the present case a single police officer was con-
fronted with several people on a rural road. The officer 
testified that the appellant was agitating an adult male 
and the officer also felt a threat of violence from the 
other people that had been in the stopped vehicle (T. 13, 
20). Under these circumstances the order to disperse 
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given to the appellant was suited to the occision and 
satisfied an important governmental interest in pro-
tecting a police officer from possible interference or 
interruption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953) can easily be 
distinguished from the ordinance found unconstitutional 
in Lewis v. New Orleans, U.S , 39 L.Ed. 2d 
214 (1974). See appellant's brief at 9. The Court ob-
jected to the ordinance because it punished only spoken 
words. The Court then proceeded to state that the ordi-
nance would withstand an attack upon its facial consti-
tutionality only if it is not susceptible of application to 
speech, although regular or offensive, that is protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendment. 39 L.Ed, at 
219. 
As reasonably construed, Section 76-8-305, is not 
overbroad in that it does not prohibit the lawful exercise 
of any constitutional right. The plain meaning of the 
statute, in requiring that the proscribed conduct be done 
"intentionally" is that the specified intent must be the 
predominant intent. Predominance can be determined 
either (1) from the fact that no bona fide intent to exer-
cise a constitutional right appears to have existed or 
(2) from the fact that the interest to be advanced by 
the particular exercise of a constitutional right is insigni-
ficant in comparison with the inconvenience, annoyance 
or alarm caused by the exercise. 
In the instant case the evidence warrants the con-
clusion that the appellant was not undertaking to exer-
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cise any constitutionally protected freedom. She was not 
exercising the right of freedom of speech because that 
right is concerned with expression of thought or dissem-
ination of idea. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 
80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1959). Appellant was 
not seeking to express a thought to any listener or to 
disseminate any idea. She simply was trying to irritate 
the police officer by her presence and by efforts at in-
terruption. Her speech and conduct had no purpose 
other than to cause inconvenience and annoyance. 
Individuals cannot be convicted under Section 76-8-
305 merely for expressing unpopular or annoying ideas. 
The statute comes into operation only when the indi-
vidual's interest in expression, judged in the light of 
all relevant factors, is miniscule compared to a particular 
public interest in preventing that expression or conduct 
at that time and place. The statute as applied here did 
not chill or stifle the exercise of any constitutional right. 
Appellant's conviction is therefore proper and must 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPEL-
LANT WAS CONVICTED FOR INTERFER-
ING WITH AN ARREST OR DETENTION 
DOES APPLY TO APPELLANT'S CON-
DUCT. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
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305 (Supp. 1973), under which she was arrested for 
interfering with an arrest or detention, limits its appli-
cation to force or conceivably threats of force, which in 
fact constitute actual intereference, and does not apply 
to other forms of speech. See Appellant's brief at 14. 
In the General Provisions of the Utah Criminal 
Code, Section 76-1-106 states in part: 
"All provisions of this code and offenses 
defined by the laws of this state shall be con-
strued according to the fair import of their 
terms to promote justice and to effect the ob-
jects of the law and general purposes of sec-
tion 76-1-104, Utah Code Ann. (1953)." 
When dealing with the interpretation of the words 
in a statute, the Utah Supreme Court in Grant v. Utah 
State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P . 2d 1035 
(1971), stated: 
"Foundational rules require that we as-
sume that each term of a statute was used ad-
visedly; and that each should be given an in-
terpretation and application in accord with 
their usually accepted meaning, unless the con-
text otherwise requires." 485 P. 2d at 1036 
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Edi-
tion (1934), defines interference as, "to enter into, or 
take a part in, the concerns of others; to intermeddle; 
interpose; intervene." The definiation given by the 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan-
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guage (1973) of interference is, "to be a hindrance or 
obstacle; impede." 
To contend that the word interference as used in 
Section 76-8-305 is limited to force or threats of force 
would apply it to a strict construction in violation of 
Section 76-1-106, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1973), and 
do an injustice to the "usually accepted meaning test" 
as laid down by this Court in Grant. 
The Utah Supreme Court gave an interpretation 
of the meaning of "interference" in construing a former 
interference statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 (1953) 
in State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P. 2d 1060 
(1955): 
"Such interference or resistance need not be 
in the form of physical force or violence, but it 
is sufficient that there be some direct action 
amounting to affirmative interference." 286 
P . 2d at 1062. 
In the present case, the appellant attempted to 
engage the officer in a conversation and was informed 
that she was interfering and was requested to leave the 
area (T. 6). Appellant left the area, but in a short time 
returned and again attempted to engage the officer in 
conversation (T. 16). In response to another request 
to leave the area the appellant responded with profanity 
(T. 8). The arresting officer testified that the appel-
lant was interfering with his work and causing him an 
unusual amount of time to effect an arrest (T. 9, 10). 
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All these acts, coupled together, definitely amount to an 
affirmative interference punishable by Section 76-8-305, 
Utah Code Ann. 
In State v. Taylor, 38 N.J.Super. 6, 118 A.2d 36 
(1955), the Appellant Division of the Superior Court 
of New Jersey held that interference with police in the 
lawful discharge of their duties occurs if the conduct 
of the person charged was calculated in any appreciable 
degree to hamper or impede police in performance of 
their duties as they saw them. In State v. Harris, 4 
Conn. Cir. 534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967), the Appellate 
Division of the Circuit Court of Connecticut held that 
when the defendant approached police while they were 
arresting an intoxicated man and made the task of the 
officer's more difficult by talking and arguing with the 
police was guilty of interfering with police. 
Therefore, Section 76-8-305, Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1973) was properly applied in the present case 
and appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
THE LOWER COURT ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-100 (1953), states in 
part: 
"When a child is found to come within the 
provisions of Section 55-10-77, the court shall 
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so adjudicate and make a finding of the facts 
upon which it bases its jurisdiction over the 
child." 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-77 (1953), states in part: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the 
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
in proceedings: 
(1) Concerning any child who has vio-
lated any federal, state, or local law or muni-
cipal ordinance.. . ." 
The court below heard uncontradicted testimony 
from a police officer that the appellant had interf erred 
with his work as an officer by causing him an unusual 
amount of time to effect an arrest (T. 9, 10). The court 
then specifically found that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(1953), covered the particular situation in which the ap-
pellant was involved and therefore the allegations of the 
petition charging the appellant with interfering with 
an officer were true (T. 30). 
The court had also heard uncontradicted evidence 
from the officer that the appellant had consumed alco-
holic beverages (T. 8, 9, 11). The court again made the 
specific finding that the officer was competent to render 
an opinion in this area and the court was convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had been 
consuming an alcoholic beverage in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 32-7-15. 
Since the court found that appellant had violated 
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two sections of the Utah Criminal Code it had jurisdic-
tion over the appellant per section 55-10-77. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute under which appellant was arrested 
for interfering with an officer is constitutionally per-
missible and appellant's conduct clearly falls within the 
boundaries of the statute. In addition ,the lower court's 
findings and conclusions are sufficient to support appel-
lant's conviction. For these reasons, respondent respect-
fully submits that the conviction of Virginia Joanie 
Goodman should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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